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COMMENTS ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
OF AGE DISCRIMINATION
MARTIN LYON LEVINE*

Age discrimination claims in our society have been treated generally as matters for private decision or legislative action. The judicial
role has largely been restricted to interpretation and enforcement of
statutes rather than independent action based on common law or constitutional authority.' The age discrimination symposium in which this
article appears has therefore focused on statutes. A number of legal
writers and judges have nevertheless proposed the recognition of a constitutional law of age discrimination; 2 the paper by Howard Eglit, conference director, 3 is the most recent and ambitious of these proposals.
This article comments on the constitutional law of age discrimination. It begins with a summary of Eglit's thesis, followed by a discussion of several difficulties with it. Thereafter, his thesis is considered
* Professor of Law, Professor'of Gerontology and Professor of Psychiatry and the Behavioral Sciences, University of Southern California; President, National Senior Citizens Law Center,
Inc. B.A., Brandeis University; J.D., Yale University. Support of underlying research was provided by the generosity of the UPS Foundation, as part of the Law and Aging project at the
University of Southern California, through the assistance of Dean Scott H. Bice and Dean James
Birren.
1. Levine, "Age Discrimination" as a Legal Conceptfor Analyzing Age- Work Issues, in
WORK AND RETIREMENT: POLICY ISSUES 45 (P. Ragan ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as Age Discrimination1.
2. By a "constitutional law of age discrimination" is meant a variety of constitutional doctrines dealing with claims that age-based governmental decisions, or laws adversely impacting on
one age group, are constitutionally impermissible. The prime component of such a body of law
would be a doctrine determining when such decisions constitute a violation of the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment and the equivalent doctrine encompassed in the fifth amendment. As to the elderly, see, e.g., Note, Too Old to Work: The Constitutionalityof Mandatory
Retirement Plans, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 150 (1970); Eglit, Is Compulsory Retirement Constitutional?, 1
CIv. LIB. REV. 89 (Fall 1974); Note, Age Discriminationin Employment: Correctinga Constitutionally Infirm Legislative Judgment, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 1311 (1974); Note, MandatoryRetirement- A
Vehiclefor Age Discrimination, 51 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 116 (1974); Note, Age Dicriminationin
Employment, 50 N.Y.U. L. REV. 924 (1975); Note, The Constitutional Challenge to Mandatory
Retirement Statutes, 49 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 748 (1975); Comment, ConstitutionalAttacks on
Mandatory Retirement. A Reconsideration, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 549 (1976). As to children, see,
e.g., Tribe, Childhood,Suspect Classcationsand Conclusive Presumptions."Three Linked Riddles,
39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 8 (1975); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1077-82 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as TRIBE]; Burt, Developing ConstitutionalRights Of In, andFor Children, 39
LAW & CoNTEMP. PRoB. 118 (1975); H. COHEN, EQUAL RIGHTS FOR CHILDREN (1980).
3. Eglit, "Of Age and the Constitution," a paper presented at The National Conference on
Constitutional and Legal Issues Relating to Age Discrimination and the Age Discrimination Act,
May 1981, and appearing, as revised, in Eglit, OfAge andthe Constitution, 57 CHI. KENT L. REV.
859 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Eglit].
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against three requirements for any adequate theory of the constitutional law of age discrimination: first, any proposed new doctrine
should be related to the current constitutional case law to demonstrate
what continuities exist; second, a proposed constitutional doctrine
should be clear as to its assumptions on the United States Supreme
Court's role in social decisionmaking; and third, a proposed doctrine
on age discrimination should be clear as to the phenomenon with
which it is concerned. Although some references will be made in this
article to the wider definition of "age discrimination" encompassing all
age groups, most discussion will focus on the usual, narrower definition
4
of "age discrimination," ie., discrimination against the elderly.
THE "IMMUTABILITY" THESIS

Eglit's paper is the most recent contribution to the growing literature on law and aging, in which age discrimination has been a major
theme. 5 His goal is a "unified theory ' 6 of the treatment by the courts of
4. Most age discrimination litigation has involved employment bars against the elderlywhat I call the "age/work" effect. Other examples exist. For instance, age restrictions on the right
to vote have been accepted in dicta in several Supreme Court cases. See, e.g., Hill v. Stone, 421
U.S. 289, 297 (1975). See also cases cited in Eglit, supra note 3, at 892-94. Only because children
lack "full capacity for individual choice" may the state deprive them of the right to vote or to
marry. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 650 (1968) (Stewart, J., concurring). The young
have not been found to be a "cognizable" class whose omission from the jury venire is unconstitutional. See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 137 (1974) (assuming arguendo young new
voters are a cognizable group, no discrimination was found). See generally Zeigler, Young Adults
as a Cognizable Group in Jury Selection, 76 MICH. L. REV. 1045 (1978); J. VAN DYKE, JuRY
SELECTION PROCEDURES 35, 331 app. H (1977); Eglit, supra note 3, at 866-71.

The line of

Supreme Court cases on abortions for minors has not yet made clear how age classification (as
distinct from an unemancipated status) will be treated. See, e.g., H.L. v. Matheson, 101 S. Ct.
1164 (1981); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); Planned Parenthood of Cent. Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
5. See generally Cohen, Legal Research Issues on Aging, 14 GERONTOLOGIST 263 (1974);
Levine, Research in Law andAging, 20 GERONTOLOGIST 163 (1980); Levine, Introduction: Themes
andIssues in Gerontology and Law, 73 LAW LIB. J. 259 (1980); Cain, The Growing Importanceof
LegalAge in Deterniningthe Status ofthe Elderly, 14 GERONTOLOGIST 167 (1974); Age Dircrimination, supra note 1; Levine, Puzzles in Age/Work Policy. The Mandatory Retirement Debate
(manuscript pending publication, on file with the University of Southern California Law Library).
See also Mubarak, Sapienza & Shimane, Gerontology and the Law.- A Selected Bibliography, 73
LAW Lm. J. 255 (1980).
In an important article dealing with the statutory, rather than the constitutional, concept of
age discrimination, Peter H. Schuck has argued that age groups, unlike racial minorities, have not
been subjected to political disabilities or historical disadvantages that would justify regarding the
outcomes of the political process as suspect. See Schuck, The Graying of Civil Rights Law. The
Age DiscriminationAct of 1975, 89 YALE L.J. 27, 37 nn.41-43 (1979). He also finds age-based
categories too useful as allocative principles to regard a nondiscrimination principle properly applicable to age. Id Schuck's statutory argument has implications for the constitutional issue, but
consideration of his analysis is beyond the scope of this article and must await consideration in
another context.
6. Eght, supra note 3, at 863-64. A comprehensive constitutional law of age discrimination
should analyze not just equal protection questions, but also the definition of substantive rights
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age distinctions under the Constitution. A unified theory encompasses
age distinctions affecting the young and the middle-aged as well as the
elderly, age-based benefits as well as deprivations, and the full range
of substantive areas, including voter eligibility, jury service and
mandatory retirement.
Age-based deprivations imposed on the elderly have been treated
by Congress as age discrimination in a variety of statutes, 7 and there
have been prior proposals 8 for the judiciary to employ the age discrimination concept in a new equal protection doctrine. These proposals
have so far been flatly rejected by the United States Supreme Court,
notably in MassachusettsBoard of Retirement v. Murgia9 and Vance v.
Bradley.'0 Several intellectual tasks confront one resubmitting such a
proposal. One problem is to develop a principle explaining why the

Court should recognize age-based classifications as suspect," particularly in a period when it is hesitant to undertake further expansion of
important to certain age groups. See, e.g., the cases on abortion-related rights of adolescents,
supra note 4; Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (right of grandmother to live
with her grandchild); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (liquor laws restricting youths); Fleming
v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960) (protection of Social Security benefits).
The attempt to establish such a unified theory is part of the process of recognition of a new
topic in constitutional law---the constitutional law of age discrimination. This process compares
with proposals to recognize the wider subject of law and aging as a new field within legal study, or
gerontology as a discipline in itself. See Levine, Legal Educationand Curriculum Innovation. Law
andAging as a New Field of Law, 65 MINN. L. REV. 267 (1981); Levine, Guest Editorial: Does
Gerontology Exist?, 21 GERONTOLOGIST 2 (1981). To stake out such a separate topic, field or
discipline has a self-fulfilling characteristic. The compilation of elements not previously considered under one category facilitates and stimulates further work in the area.
7. See Age Discrimination,supra note 1, at 50-57.
8. See note 2 supra.
9. 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
10. 440 U.S. 93 (1979).
I1. Under the Warren Court in the 1960s,
[t]he familiar signals of "suspect classification" and "fundamental interest" came to trigger the occasions for [a]. . . new interventionist stance. . . . Some situations evoked the
aggressive "new" equal protection, with scrutiny that was "strict" in theory and fatal in
fact; in other contexts, the deferential "old" equal protection reigned, with minimal scrutiny in theory and virtually none in fact.
Gunther, Foreword- In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Modelfor a Newer
EqualProtection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Gunther]. Gunther found in
the cases of the Supreme Court's 1971 term a "new bite" for the "traditional toothless minimal
scrutiny standard." Id at 18-20. Five years later, Scott Bice was able to conclude that the
"Supreme Court may well have established, or be on its way to establishing, a three-tiered standard of review under the equal protection clause." Bice, Standards of JudicialReview Under the
EqualProtection and Due Process Clauses, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 689, 706 (1977). While the lowest
tier, "toothless minimal scrutiny," continued to be used in many cases, gender was increasingly
treated as a "semi-suspect" classification that elicited an intermediate level of scrutiny. This intermediate level was called "heightened scrutiny," see Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); see also
Rostker v. Goldberg, 101 S. Ct. 2646 (1981), or just "scrutiny." See Off v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268
(1979).
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enhanced scrutiny. 12 An additional problem for a unified theory is to

explain whether age-based deprivations imposed on the young are
more, less or equally acceptable compared to age-based deprivations
imposed on the elderly. A third problem, especially troubling to advocates for the elderly, is to find a principled basis upon which to distinguish age-based deprivations imposed on the elderly, which they wish
to condemn, from age-based benefits for the elderly, which they wish to

preserve. On the face of it, it seems paradoxical to hold simultaneously
3

to these positions.'
The solution Eglit proposes is essentially that governmental deprivations are "semi-suspect" under current equal protection theory when
the classification rests on a personal characteristic that has not been

freely chosen and cannot be freely abandoned.' 4 "[Ilmmutability is a
significant factor in the suspectness equation,"' 5 he says, and it is so
central to his argument that, for convenience, Eglit's thesis will be re-

ferred to as the "immutability" principle. As applied to age discrimination, since an individual does not choose his age and cannot change it,
both youth and old age might be thought suspect under Eglit's proposal. He does conclude that being elderly is an immutable characteristic,
and thus that deprivations imposed because of advanced age qualify
for at least the intermediate (semi-suspect) level of judicial scrutiny. As

for being young, however, Eglit concludes that its use as a basis for a
12. By "enhanced scrutiny" is meant more scrutiny than the minimum rationality test provides, encompassing thereby both "strict" and "middle-tier" scrutiny. See note 11 supra.
It is a shame to speak of different tiers of scrutiny as if the Court were employing a mechanical system. John Ely puts it neatly when he reminds us that we speak of a "suspect" classification
because it is le motust. Ely, The Centralityand Limits of Motivation Analysir, 15 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 1155, 1158 (1978). The Court's variation in characterizing the several tests it uses may be
more than imprecision, uncertainty or "elegant variation," see H. FOWLER, A DICTIONARY OF
MODERN ENGLISH USAGE 148-51 (2d ed. 1965), but a signal that its analysis is not one of rigid
distinctions. The Court has warned us that the treatises may have it too neat, by using phrases like
"so-called 'suspect' classification." Jiminez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 631 (1974). As the Court
recently said,
Announced degrees of "deference" to legislative judgments, just as levels of "scrutiny"
which this Court announces that it applies to particular classifications made by a legislative body, may all too readily become facile abstractions used to justify a result ...
Simply labelling the legislative decision... "gender-based"... does not automatically
guide a court to the correct constitutional result.
Rostker v. Goldberg, 101 S. Ct. 2646, 2654 (1981). The future development of equal protection
law may abandon the current two-step analysis of selection from among levels of scrutiny and
application of the chosen level, perhaps for a one-step method related to Justice Marshall's sliding
scale, see, e.g., Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 318 (1976) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting), or perhaps for a move away from the equal protection clause to other constitutional
provisions. See C. BLACK, DECISION ACCORDING TO LAW (1981) [hereinafter cited as BLACK].
13. See Age Dircrimination,supra note 1,at 62.
14. Eglit, supra note 3, at 889.
15. Id

AGE DISCRIMINATION

governmental deprivation invokes only a lesser quantum of scrutiny-a
fourth level between the "intermediate" and "minimal" tiers that might
be termed "somewhat suspect." Benefits granted to the elderly can be
conceptualized as relative deprivations imposed on the middle-aged
and young; the less enhanced ("somewhat suspect") level of scrutiny is
required for such benefits under this analysis. Benefits for the young
would be semi-suspect.
The conclusion that a deprivation imposed on those who are too
young merits less scrutiny than a deprivation imposed on those who are
too old is adopted by Eglit for several reasons.' 6 Most important, the
deprivation is not immutable: the youngster will outgrow the agebased disability.' 7 "Permanency of deprivation is the key[,]" says Eglit.
"It is the factor which separates, in the first instance, tolerable age distinctions from those which warrant a suspicious examination." '8 Additionally, lack of "congruity" and stigmatization are "special aspects"
16. In his article, supra note 3, at 910 n.220, Eglit states an additional reason why he regards
"generalizations based on being too old [tobe] inappropriate, particularly as contrasted with bar."Laws imposing disabilities on the old (like mandatory
riers erected for those too young.....
retirement at age 50) are grounded on an "information base" as to the past performance of the
relevant group, while disabilities imposed on the young (like exclusion of those under age 16 from
driving) have no such body of data available. In what Eglit terms a "catch 22" argument, the law
excluding the young from the opportunity, which simultaneously prevents accumulation of data
on their abilities, is accepted by him as tending to immunize the law from judicial review.
"[Tihere is less warrant for holding the legislator or administrator accountable, since he cannot be
charged with ignoring, or relying upon, experience as the basis for his decision." Id
There are several objections to this differentiation of disqualifications imposed on the old and
young. In both cases there is data available on those at the critical age. In both cases there is also
just as the performdata on those within the non-disqualified period that can be extrapolated, e.g.,
ance curve on those 40 to 50 can be projected forward past 50, so too the performance curve on
those 16 to 25 can be projected backwards. Moreover, in both cases the group subjected to the
disqualification is available for testing. Furthermore, natural experiments may be available for
study in other jurisdictions with different rules. Additionally, in both cases individualized determination is possible. In fact, in both of Eglit's examples, the police retirement program with an
age 50 retirement date and driver's license programs with age 16 qualification rules, such individualized testing programs were in place.
Finally, the judicial decision to allow the legislature to act in the absence of data is one that
logically follows the choice to apply a minimal rationality standard, and cannot serve to justify
that choice; where intermediate scrutiny is applied, the government is expected to have a factual
basis for its action. The point may be illustrated through comparison with Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 190 (1976), involving liquor law disabilities imposed on late adolescent boys. In the case as
argued and decided, the disqualification was analyzed as gender discrimination, and struck down
because the facts did not establish a close enough fit between the classification and the legislative
purpose. The case could have been analyzed as age differentiation, and would have had to be
analyzed as such if the legislature had applied the disqualification equally to late adolescents of
both sexes. The facts gave as little support for the age differentiation as the sex differentiation.
Once conceptualized as legislation aimed at youth, and recognized as based on weak factual support, whether the law stands or falls depends on the Court's prior decision whether or not to apply
to age discrimination the same standard of review accorded gender discrimination.
17. Eglit, supra note 3, at 905.
18. Id at 913.
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that he believes identify which immutable characteristics are impermissible bases for classification. 19 Thus, he regards differential treatment
of minors as grounded in reality in that lack of age has "congruity" to
relevant characteristics such as judgmental capacity, physical ability
and emotional and psychological maturity. By contrast, "it is rare that
the characteristic of too many years will bear a relation to ability to
perform or contribute to society. ' ' 20 Moreover, to be young is glorified
in our society, he says, while being labeled elderly is stigmatizing. 2 1
The immutability principle reconciles Eglit's intuitions on the
problems stated above. He deems use of age-based classifications to be
a "vice" contravening a fundamental value of our legal system; yet he
nevertheless regards age-based deprivations imposed on children as
"generally more tolerable" 22 and treats benefits for the elderly as also
more tolerable.
Eglit proposes five specific guidelines or "postulates" in his thesis
which he suggests the courts should apply in deciding age discrimination claims under the equal protection clause. First, "unadorned age
distinctions" without subordinating justification "have no redeeming
merit." 23 Second, "the user of the age line. . . should bear the burden
of justification. '' 24 Third, ageism, unlike racial and gender distinctions,
25
is "a phenomenon whose invidiousness varies with the setting."
Fourth, when age is used as a basis for depriving a person of a right
which is secured under the Constitution and which, but for his age, )1e
could successfully claim, "the standard of scrutiny which that right ordinarily evokes should apply to the age distinction now tied up with
that right."' 26 The fourth principle is qualified, however, in that the
selection of an age line for imposing disabilities on the young requires
lessened justification. In line with that qualification, his fifth principle
is that "age distinctions which penalize someone for being too old are
more invidious, and thus should elicit more stringent judicial scrutiny,
than those which penalize for being too young." 27 These guidelines are
discussed and criticized below.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id

at
at
at
at
at

907-10.
910.
908.
906.
904.

at 905.
at 906.
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PROBLEMS WITH THE "IMMUTABILITY" THESIS

The Eglit paper is a complex and well documented one, but its
thesis has several problems which deserve discussion. Descriptively,
immutability has not been the touchstone by which the Supreme
Court
has consistently differentiated suspect from nonsuspect classifications,
and prescriptively, it is neither a necessary nor a sufficient criterion for
enhanced scrutiny. The immutability doctrine also, on analysis, is not
derivable from the other values Eglit invokes. Moreover, much of Eglit's analysis is phrased in terms of an abstract definition of age, and its
suspect nature as a classificationper se; it is preferable to attend more
to the social realities of the age classes differentially treated. Furthermore, while Eglit's chief interest is the elderly, a major proposal of his
unified theory is that deprivations based on youth need not be treated
as quasi-suspect; a study focused on the problems of youth might well
reach a different conclusion as to them. Finally, the set of five guidelines proposed by Eglit are also problematic. Each of these points will
now be elaborated.
Immutability as a Trigger
Immutability as a trigger of enhanced scrutiny is at the center of
Eglit's thesis. In current Court opinions, however, a statute's use of an
immutable characteristic as the basis for a legislative classification has
not been treated as sufficient to invoke such scrutiny. Intellectual and
physical disability, for example, have been offered in dictum as examples of unchosen and unchangeable personal characteristics that, if
used as a basis for legislative classifications, are nevertheless to be subjected to only the lowest tier analysis. 28 Nor has immutability been
treated as a necessary condition for enhanced scrutiny. Alienage is a
characteristic that is a product of previously chosen action or inaction,
and that remains changeable. "[A]liens . . . in effect have chosen to
classify themselves," the Court has observed. 29 The characteristic has
30
nevertheless frequently elicited enhanced scrutiny.
To turn to the question of what the Court should do, whether a
characteristic is immutable or changeable has no necessary correlation

with whether it is an appropriate or inappropriate basis for governmen28. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1971) (plurality opinion). This dictum, of
course, should not be taken as foreclosing the issue of discrimination against the handicapped.
29. Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 80 (1979).
30. Eg., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971). But see Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S.
68 (1979). See generaly Note, A Dual Standardfor State Discrimination Against Aliens, 92 HARV.
L. REV. 1516 (1979); BLAcK, supra note 14, at 56-62.
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tal action. One does not in fact suspect biased motives, expect the
targeted class to experience a slur or detect a distortion of the political
process, for example, if innate limits of strength are used to guide governmental selection of laborers, or if intelligence is used to guide governmental scholarship awards. On the other hand, even if the advent
of new chemicals were to make skin color an easily mutable matter of
choice, 3' given our society's history, any governmental burdens imposed on the dark-skinned would still be highly suspect as discriminatory in purpose and in effect. Similarly, that religion is a matter of
choice and mutable does not make it nonsuspect as a basis of governmental classification. 32 Immutability is not an appropriate criterion of
enhanced scrutiny, either in a descriptive account of what the Court
has said and done or in a prescription of what the Court should do.
An "immutability plus" trigger is suggested by Eglit's added qualification that two "special aspects" distinguish immutable characteristics
that are permissible bases of governmental classifications from the impermissible: whether or not the characteristic involves stigmatization,
and whether or not it lacks "congruity" with the ability to perform or
contribute to society. 33 He offers arguments based on these special aspects as additional reasons for treating disabilities imposed on the eldis treated, and for tolerating disabilities
erly as gender discrimination
34
imposed on the young.
The "immutability plus" thesis also seems unsatisfactory both descriptively and prescriptively. It may be that one or both of the factors,
or something like them, should trigger enhanced scrutiny, but it is not
because they are "special aspects" of immutability. They are the basis
for independent equal protection arguments unconnected with immutability. Moreover, there are other formulations--stereotyping and
prejudice-overlapping those he offers, which are more useful, as discussed below. 35 The concept of stigmatization which Eglit employs
does not capture the reality of attitudes toward the elderly; ambivalence may be closer to the mark. Similarly, there is insufficient substantiation for his sharp differentiation that being too old is
stigmatizing while being too young is not; for every phrase like "old
fool" he mentions, 36 our language also has one like "young fool." Nor
31. See J. GRIFFIN, BLACK LiKE ME (1977 ed.).
32. See Jones v. Helms, 101 S. Ct. 2434, 2442 n.23 (1981).

33.
34.
35.
36.

Eglit, supra note 3, at 907-10.
Id at 906.
See notes 131-39 & 150-57 mfra and accompanying text.
Eglit, supra note 3, at 908.
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has he made a convincing case that generalizations about youth are

more accurate than generalizations about the elderly.
Underlying Values
The immutability principle is also insufficiently supported by Eglit's declared underlying values. Legal arguments rest upon assumed
values; the values underlying Eglit's reasoning are stated by him in a
number of phrases which bridge his basic posits and the working guidelines that ultimately rest upon them. In his major argument, he mentions various consequentialist considerations such as productivity, and
37
also the "basic social concepts of equality and individual worth,
"basic notions of equality and justice," 38 the principle that people
39
should be treated according to their individual "abilities and needs"
rather than according to stereotypes, and the "fundamental societal
valu[e]" that "legal burdens. . . should bear some relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing." 4 A value rejecting immutability
is implied in the statement that "what makes ageism particularly bad is
that, . . . it segregates the individual on the basis of a characteristic
which he himself has not chosen, and which he has no power to
change[,] ' '4 an idea otherwise stated as "a characteristic which is immutable at any given point in time .... -42 Elsewhere in his argument
he suggests a revised version of this value by stating that
'43
"[p]ermanency of deprivation is the key."
There is a tension among Eglit's several formulations of the values
and principles he adopts. This section begins to work out the relationship among Eglit's numerous implicit values, which are here termed
"individual wrongdoing," "individual responsibility,....individual
worth," "congruity" and "equality," and rejection of "immutability,"
"permanency" and "stigmatization." Eglit on occasion seems to use
some of these ideas as more or less equivalent, but distinctions need to
be made.
Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,44 a Supreme Court case on
illegitimacy which Eglit quotes, 45 declares the principle that legal bur37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id at 861.
Id at 901.
Id at 862.
Id (quoting Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972)).
Id at 861-62.
Id at 901.
Id at 913.
406 U.S. 164 (1972).
See note 40 supra.
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dens should bear a relationship to individual wrongdoing.46 That is a
narrow individual responsibility value: one should be punished only
for his own actions. Eglit's argument requires that he generalize that
principle to say that both legal benefits and burdens be based upon
individual choice, a broader individualresponsibility value. His reasoning then requires one additional step to his immutability principle that
legal benefits and burdens be allocated only on the basis of characteristics an individual has opted for and can opt out of; this additional step
is required because a person may have voluntarily acquired characteristics which are thereafter unchangeable.
Eglit strays from his other underlying values in his revised definition of immutability as permanency. He regards childhood (or any
stage with a maximum age limit) as a mutable characteristic because it
is not permanent, and for that reason finds it a more appropriate basis
of governmental classification than old age (or any stage with a minimum age limit), which is permanent. As he himself recognizes elsewhere, however, at any given point in time age is, of course, immutable;
there can obviously be no individual responsibility for retaining that
characteristic. His treatment of childhood as non-immutable because
not permanent, and for that reason less suspect a category than old age,
thus revises the definition of immutability to sever its value base in
individual responsibility.
The immutability principle reflects quite a different value from
that of individual worth-the notion that a person be treated according
to individual capacities and merits; the difference is that a person has
many attributes which he neither has chosen nor can change. Thus
Eglit's approval of legal burdens placed on children rests in part on the
individual worth value, reasoning that since children really do have
limited capacities, it is proper to treat them thusly. Such treatment is
not justifiable under the individual responsibility value since they did
not choose to be children and cannot then choose to be adults. To be
consistent as to the individual worth value, one would conclude, contrary to Eglit, that whether or not it is proper to treat elders as having
limited capacities depends solely on whether or not in fact they do have
such limits, without regard to whether or not they chose them or can
abandon them.
The relationship of the equality value to Eglit's argument is a difficult one. Of course, one sense of equality is satisfied by treating all
alike, and another is satisfied by treating like things alike. To do the
46. 406 U.S. at 175.
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latter requires recognition of which characteristics are relevant and
what categories adequately group together those persons who are sufficiently alike in that characteristic. The problem with age discrimination is that, contrary to Eglit,47 old age is indeed often a proxy for
relevant characteristics (although a weak one), and age lines thus may
define categories of persons appropriate for the questions at hand (although only somewhat so). Equality only requires that the invocation
of age categories be restricted to those uses which accurately enough
reflect personal characteristics relevant to the purpose at hand,48 thus
corresponding to the individual worth value. It is inaccurate stereotypes which are rejected. On this reasoning, Eglit's immutability principle cannot be derived from his equality value, because immutability
is irrelevant to the accuracy of a categorization.
A value rejecting stigmatization, or "[group, or individual denigration, ' 49 and one requiring "congruity" between a classification and
relevant individual characteristics, are also implicit in Eglit's argument
about "special aspects" of certain immutable characteristics. 50 Eglit's
argument can better be understood in terms of the individual worth
value. Several writers have pointed out the significance of stigmatization for understanding race discrimination law. 5 1 The rejection of stig47. Eglit, supra note 3, at 910. The general principle that those alike in relevant respects
should be treated alike, Aristotelian in origin, has long been part of equal protection analysis. See
Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection ofthe Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REv. 341 (1949). The principle poses but does not solve the problem of classification.
48. Some of the case law under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29
U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976 & Supp. III 1979), suggests that, even under the strict statutory nondiscrimination rule, age may be used as a proxy for a relevant characteristic, and thus age classifications used in place of individualized determinations, in work at the core of some job and involving
danger to life, where either of two situations exist: (a) age is an excellent proxy for the characteristic, in that substantially all members of the age group share the characteristic; and (b) age is a
good proxy for the characteristic, and individualized determination is impracticable. See Arritt v.
Grisell, 567 F.2d 1267 (4th Cir. 1977); Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, 531 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976);
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission interpretations of Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 50 U.S.L.W. 2085 (August 11, 1981) (agency ruling).
49. Eglit, supra note 3, at 907-08.
50. See note 19 supra.
51. For instance, Larry Simon has provided an extensive analysis of the constitutional significance of racial insult and prejudice. See Simon, Racially Preiaced Governmental Actions. A
Motivation Theory of the Constitutional Ban Against Racial Discrimination, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
1041 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Simon].
Stigma is an old concept in race discrimination cases. One of the grounds relied on in
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879), was that the statute was "practically a brand upon
them... an assertion of their inferiority." Id at 308. See also Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537,
560, 562 (1.96) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Analysis can focus either on "stigma" as felt by the victim class or on "stigma" as intended by
the ruling class. See, eg., Karst, Foreword- Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment,
91 HARv. L. REV. 1, 68 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Karst]. As to the victim's perception of stigma,
compare Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. at 551 (if segregation stigmatizes, it is "solely because the
colored race chooses to put that construction upon it.") with Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S.
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matization, however, is not a universal principle of our legal system.
One of the primary functions of criminal law, for example, is to provide
for stigmatization of criminals, and Paul v. Davis52 held that even governmental imposition of stigma when undeserved did not violate the
due process clause. Undeserved stigmatization does nevertheless contravene the individual worth value. Moreover, to the extent that a
law's classification involves a stigmatized group, the law is likely to in-

volve incorrect stereotyping, again violating the individual worth value.
The "congruity" point similarly is a requirement that generalization be
sufficiently accurate, another expression of the individual worth value.
Stereotyping and prejudice are further discussed below. 53 On analysis,
neither Eglit's stigmatization nor congruity points seems to support or
derive from his central immutability value.
The discussion in this section has attempted to show that Eglit cannot derive an immutability doctrine from any of the other values he
adopts, but only by directly assuming the value; the conclusion comes
out of his machinery of analysis because that is what he started with.
Those who do not choose to take the immutability value as an assumption will therefore be less convinced by Eglit's rejection of age-based
burdens on the elderly, as well as by his relative tolerance for age-based
disabilities imposed on the young.
How then has immutability entered equal protection discussion? 54
483, 494 (1954) (segregation of black pupils "generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in
the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely to ever be undone.").
Paul Brest argues that "[djecisions based on assumptions of intrinsic worth and selective indifference inflict psychological injury by stigmatizing their victims as inferior[;]" even unconsciously discriminating acts are "stigmatic, for to show less empathy for people because of their
race is to treat them as less human because of their race." Brest, Foreword- In Defense of the
AntidsriminationPrincoile, 90 HARv.L. REV. 1,8, 14 (1976). In Karst's analysis, "[tlhe first set of
considerations relevant to the suspectness of a legislative classification grows out of solicitude for
the victims of stigma." Karst, supra, at 23. He argues that "while not all inequalities stigmatize,
the essence of any stigma lies in the fact that the affected individual is regarded as an unequal in
some respect." Id. at 6. Injurious effects of stigmatizing inequalities include both the psychological (damaging self-respect) and the tangible (justifying depnvations). Id. at 6-8.
J. Morris Clark has stated that "[m]otivation is relevant to constitutional decisions,... because laws passed for reasons of prejudice or animus frequently stigmatize those whom they burden, and they create feelings that the social contract between the government and the governed
has been unfairly broken." Clark, Legislative Motivation and FundamentalRights in Constitutional

Law, 15 SAi Dinoo L. REv.953, 954 (1978). Clark adds, "[Cionsidering a lawmaker's perception
of another individual's low worth or stature honest but mistaken does not make that perception
any less stigmatic ..... Id at 965.
52. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
53. See notes 131-39 infra and accompanying text.
54. See P. BREST, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECiStONMAKINo 576, 607 (1975). A

treatise indeed brackets "classifications based on immutable characteristics" between "suspect
classifications" and "fundamental rights" as the triggers of enhanced scrutiny. See J. NowAK, R.
ROTUNDA & J. YouNGo, AMERiCAN CONSTrrUTONA LAW 77 (Supp. 1979-1980).
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Several suspect classifications, including race and gender, happen in
fact to be immutable. 55 Four Justices in Froniero v. Richardson56 did
indeed argue that "since sex, like race and national origin, is an immutable characteristic determined solely by the accident of birth, the imposition of special disabilities upon the members of a particular sex
because of their sex would seem to violate 'the basic concept of our
system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual
responsibility.' -57 Those Justices then went on to switch from an individual responsibility value to one of individual worth: "And what differentiates sex from such non-suspect statuses as intelligence or
physical disability, and aligns it with the recognized suspect criteria, is
that the sex characteristic frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute to society."' 58 Both Eglit's immutability thesis and
"the special aspect" qualifications are apparently derived from the
Frontiero reasoning.
Immutability is pertinent even if it is not "the key." People may
feel a greater unfairness if disabilities are imposed on them due to characteristics never voluntarily adopted, an additional helpless rage if the
characteristics are outside their control and a greater feeling of loss if
the disabilities are permanent. Immutability is then relevant to legal
analysis because it is an aspect of the harm imposed on victims of a
by those who employ a form of balancclassification to be considered
59
ing or sliding scale test.

Classpfcationsand Classes
An additional problem with the immutability thesis concerns the
conceptual question in equal protection analysis whether to focus on
the criterion for governmental classification or on the classes thus differentially treated. For example, is race a suspect classification or is it
discrimination against blacks which is suspect? It is not clear which of
the two approaches Eglit adopts. At some points he speaks of the criterion, age, in the abstract sense as a quality "all of us, children and
adults,.

. .

posses[s,] '

6°

but elsewhere he speaks of the classes when he

55. Put see J. GRIFFIN, BLACK LIKE ME (1977 ed.); R. STOLLER, SEX AND GENDER: THE
DEVELOPMENT OF MASCULINITY AND FEMININITY 225-61 (1974 ed.).
56. 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (plurality opinion).
57. Id at 686.

58. Id
59. See generally Simson, A Methodfor Analyzing Discriminatory Effects Under the Equal
Protection Clause, 29 STAN. L. REv. 663 (1977).
60. Eglit, supra note 3, at 864. One might just as well speak of skin color as a quality all of
us, black and white, possess, the only difference among individuals being the amount of pigmenta-
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says that a "given age group is suspect." 6' Eglit's central thesis of immutability refers to age as a classification; the qualifications in terms of
the "special aspects" of stigmatizaion and "congruity" refer to the particular age groups so classified.
Major differences flow from the choice between the two approaches. To focus on age as a classification would commit one to Eglit's goal of a unified theory, while the contrasting focus on age groups
would allow the development of separate theories as to discrimination
against the elderly and against children, 62 phenomena that perhaps
have no more in common with each other than they have with gender
discrimination. Furthermore, a law depriving those over any age of a
benefit or opportunity implicates the immutability principle, but, contrary to Eglit's view, only certain maximum age lines define a stigmatized group and failure of "congruity."
Focus on the treatment of the class, rather than the characteristics
of the classification, is manifested in some judicial opinions, such as the
recent Supreme Court decision in Jones v. Helms 63 which speaks of the
equal protection clause as providing a basis for challenging laws that
"treat one group of persons as inferior or superior to others .....
64
Similarly, Jones quotes Senator Howard's statements in the fourteenth
amendment debates for the purpose of showing that the objective of the
amendment was to do away with the injustice of subjecting one "caste
of persons" to laws not applicable to others. 65 The language currently
cited as the usual test for strict scrutiny speaks of the class, not the
classification; it was used in Murgia itself to consider the situation of
the aged as the class discriminated against. The Court said that "the
aged. . . have not experienced a 'history of purposeful unequal treatment' or been subjected to unique disabilities on the basis of stereotyped characteristics not truly indicative of their abilities. . . . [Oild
age does not define a 'discrete and insular' group, . . . in need of 'extion each has. Such an approach lends an abstract air to the discussion, diverting attention from
the treatment of the groups discriminated against.
61. Id at 899.
62. Thus, for example, in discussing age-based discrimination and semi-suspect classification,
Tribe concludes that "l]ines based on old age rather than on youth would require a separate
analysis.
TUBE, supra note 2, at 1081 n.14. In another context, Christopher D. Stone has
argued that constitutional scholars should attend more to the underlying social and psychological
problems faced by the law, rather than resting content with abstractions as organizational principles. Stone, Towarda Theory of Constimlional Law Casebooks, 41 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 12-15 (1968).
See also Levine, A People-OrientedLaw Confronts Problems ofthe Elderly, U.S.C. CrrEs 16 (Fall
1980-Winter 1981).
63. 101 S. Ct. 2434 (1981).
64. Id at 2442.
65. Id at 2442 n.23.
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traordinary protection from the majoritarian political process.' "66 The
Court also considered whether a "caste of persons" was treated unjustly
when it said, "Old age does not define a group but rather a stage in
life."'67 Charles Black would go even further in rejecting a "suspect
classification" analysis, preferring an analysis concentrating on the
68
group at hand.
Focus on the characteristics of the classification, rather than on the
treatment or identity of the target class, matches the usual vocabulary
of constitutional discussion: we speak, for example, of race as a "suspect classification" rather than of blacks as a "suspect class." Justice
Powell has denied that some groups or classes are "special wards enti'69
tled to a degree of protection greater than that accorded others."
Such a focus provides a conceptual mechanism for using enhanced
scrutiny for protecting those who are not a "discrete and insular
group." Thus, as long as the doctrine is phrased in terms of gender
classification, intermediate tier standards apply whether the law discriminates against males or females, 70 even though men certainly meet
none of the tests for a group in need of the protections of enhanced
scrutiny. Focus on the classification would thus conceptually facilitate
a doctrine of enhanced scrutiny for the elderly, who also may not be a
"discrete and insular group."
66. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1975) (citation omitted).
67. Id
68. For example, in his discussion of "the constitutional law of aliens," Black rejects the
mechanistic "suspicion" and "overwhelming" state interest formula to suggest a different analysis
with the characteristic that "fillir all about aliens." BLACK, supra note 12, at 61 (emphasis in

original).
Attention to the class rather than the classification is manifested in several Supreme Court
cases permitting the explicit use of racial classification. See, e.g., University of Cal. Bd. of Regents
v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 325 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("Government may take race into
account when it acts not to demean or insult any racial group, but to remedy disadvantages cast on
); United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc.
minorities by past racial prejudice .....
v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1976) (allowing voter reapportionment along racial lines to correct inequitable situation); Swam v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (upholding assignment of school children on the basis of race to achieve balance).
Attention to the victim class is also emphasized in Freeman, Legitinzing Racial Discriminalion Through AntidiscrimmiationLaw: A CriticalReview ofSupreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L.

REV. 1049 (1978). He advocates emphasis on the victim's perspective, ie., a focus on the target
group's objective conditions of life, such as lack of jobs, as well as the consciousness associated
with those conditions, such as lack of choice and the condition of being perceived as a member of
a group rather than as an individual. Id at 1052-53.
69. University of Cal. Bd. of Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 296 (1978) (Powell, J., separate
opinion). Focus on the racial classification rather than the class disadvantaged (to the exclusion of
a theory based on United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938)) was required to justify applying more than minimal scrutiny to a rule disadvantaging whites.
70. See Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 391 (1979); Off v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 278-79
(1979); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
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DiscriminationAgainst Children
An additional concern child advocates will have with Eglit's thesis
is that he minimizes the need for scrutiny of deprivations imposed on
the young. More detailed examination of the purposes and effects of
age-based deprivations against the young may reach a conclusion opposite to Eglit's. 7 1 Consider, for example, a law which sets age 21 as
the minimum age to work, requiring compulsory school attendance until that age, where there is strong evidence that the purpose of the law is
to restrict competition for jobs, and that its effect is to confine many
youths in educational institutions from which they derive little or no
benefit. Eglit's immutability test states that "at the core, perhaps, of
accepting laws which limit and control children" is that the law can be
outgrown. 72 But that is an insufficient basis upon which to decide what
degree of scrutiny such a law deserves.
In fact, the immutability test artificially considers all deprivations
with maximum age limits (including those against young adults and the
middle-aged) as it does deprivations on children. A maximum age of
30 is no more immutable than one of 21. Only his additional "special
aspects" raise such questions as the degree to which deprivations on
children and others are invidious, stereotyped or reality-based; immutability is irrelevant to those issues, and thus of no help in analyzing
laws restricting the young.
Eglit's ProposedGuidelines
The five guidelines or "postulates" that embody the details of Eglit's proposal raise additional problems. An initial observation is that
the guidelines do not seem to embody five different substantive proposals. Two of the principles seem to attach no effect to legislative use of
age-based classifications. Thus, Eglit's first principle rejects
"unadorned age distinctions" without subordinating justification as
having "no redeeming merit. ' 73 This point appears merely to apply the
standard of minimal rationality to such legislation, which would be applicable whether an age-based classification were employed or not.
Moreover, rulemakers and interpreters will always have a claim that
age-based classifications are at least minimally rational, if only in that
they serve administrative efficiency and convenience,74 so the point
71. See note 2 supra.
72. Eglit, supra note 3, at 889.
73. Id at 904.
74. Eglit has recognized this point elsewhere: "Legislators and bureaucrats may act out of
stupidity, error, or bias, but they hardly ever create a law or policy devoid of any justification."
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seems to have little or no practical relevance. Similarly, Eglit's fourth
principle would apply to age-based classifications whatever standard of
'75
scrutiny the substantive right involved in the law "ordinarily evokes.
Here, again, age falls out of the analysis: the substantive constitutional
doctrine involved will be applied "without implicating the Equal Protection clause at all," as Justice White recently said in a similar situation.76 These two guidelines seem to boil down to the observation that
use of age classifications is not in itself an independent legitimate legislative goal.
Turning to the other Eglit guidelines, the remaining principles and
qualifications seem to reduce to two points: that "age distinctions
which penalize someone for being too old" should elicit a fairly strong
Eglit, Is Compulsory Retirement Constitutional?, 1 Civ. LIB. REV. 89, 95 (Fall 1974). Eglit believes,

in fact, that administrative considerations may even satisfy enhanced scrutiny. He argues that
age-based distinctions are needed in a variety of settings to avoid enormous social costs, staggering
expense, onerous tasks of devising adequate tests and bureaucratic mistake and abuse. The examples he offers are Social Security, conceived as a system providing entitlements to those who need
it, the driver licensing system and voting qualifications. Eglit, supra note 3. His examples, however, belie his argument. There already are in place systems to administer eligibility for Supplemental Security Income (the need-based complement to Social Security), to test applicants for
driving licenses and, in many states, to test would-be voters. Thus the administrative need to use
age-based automatic rules of eligibility seems minimaL
The Court itself, like Eglit, at times has accepted an administrative convenience rationale in
such situations. In the employment settings considered in Murgia and Vance, systems were already in place to administer periodic physical examinations and determine the continued fitness of
the employees. Thus, there was minimal administrative savings in using age-based mandatory
retirement rather than individualized determination of capacity. The Court nevertheless accepted
as constitutionally permissible the legislative choice of a generalized rule as the means to make
retirement decisions. Elsewhere it has accepted a similar choice as to other decisions, reasoning
that to "require individual determinations ... would mandate costly factfinding procedures that
would dissipate resources that could have been spent [elsewhere]." Schweiker v. Gray Panthers,
101 S.Ct. 2633, 2642 (1981) (Medicaid "deeming" rule).
Whether or not administrative convenience is an acceptable rationale for using generalizations depends upon, and cannot justify, the choice of standard of scrutiny. Under the intermediate
standard, the Court has repeatedly stated that the administrative convenience of employing a
gender classification is not an adequate constitutional justification. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 190, 198 (1976); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690-91 (1973) (plurality opinion).

75. Eglit, supra note 3, at 905.
76. Jones v. Helms, 101 S.Ct. 2434, 2443 (1981) (White, J., concurring). See also Ely, The
Centrality andLimitsof MoivationAnalysir, 15 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 1155, 1161 (1978). A proposal

similar to Eglit's has been advanced previously that the combination of age-based lines and an
unusually important interest should trigger a form of intermediate tier scrutiny. TRimE, supra note
2, at 1077-82 (particularly as to youth). It is true that some cases using intermediate scrutiny do
involve the combination of sensitive classifications and important interests. See cases cited id at
1090-91 n.10. Nevertheless, in general it is thought that intermediate scrutiny can be triggered by
the presence of an important interest alone, see cases cited id at 1077 nn. 1-4, so that the sensitivity
of the classification drops out of the analysis.
One case where the guideline apparently would have made a difference was YMCA Vote at
18 Club v. Board of Elections, 319 F. Supp. 543 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). The court there failed to employ
enhanced scrutiny to an age restriction on voting, notwithstanding voting's status as a fundamental right under cases like Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969). The
guideline may also have made a difference in the adolescent abortion cases. See note 4 supra.
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version of intermediate judicial scrutiny ("semi-suspect"), 7 and that all
other uses of age lines (the only ones logically left are benefits for the
elderly and penalties for the young) should receive a less enhanced,
78
fourth level, scrutiny ("somewhat suspect").
As to deprivations imposed on the elderly, Eglit's version of intermediate scrutiny has two aspects: when an age line burdens those too
old, an important governmental interest must be established, and the
means used-e., the age distinction-must be substantially related to
the end. 79 Similar proposals for enhanced scrutiny have been made
before8 ° and have of course been rejected by the Supreme Court in
Murgia and Vance.
As to deprivations against the young and benefits for the elderly,
Eglit's proposed test would shift to the government the burden of articulating the purpose of the age line. This doctrine can be analyzed as
adding two "bites" to a minimum rationality test: to put a burden on
the government seems to call for shifting the normal presumption of
constitutionality, and requiring government articulation of purpose requires it to take political responsibility for doing so, ruling out judicial
invention of a hypothetical purpose.
Eglit does not explain why his proposals do not include other possible intermediate tier requirements, i e., that a statute's purpose be derived from the legislature's contemporaneous statements, rather than
from the government lawyer's subsequent rationalizations,8 ' and that
individuals disadvantaged by the classification be allowed to rebut application of its presumption to them.82 Arguably, the opinions in
Vance and Murgia spoke in terms of all of these factors.8 3 Nor does
Eglit justify his limitation of the "rationality with bite" analysis to agebased lines, while other commentators have suggested it be a generally
77. Eglit, supra note 3, at 906.
78. Id at 904-05.
79. Id at 906-07.
80. See works cited in note 2 supra.
81. Eglit criticizes the Murgia and Vance Courts as "simply too lax" in not even asking the
defenders of the challenged law to articulate a justification for it. Eglit, supra note 3, at 904.
Contrary to Eglit's point, rather than merely imagining the purpose of the law and a set of facts to
justify that purpose, the Court cited in detail to legislative hearings and then reinforced the legislative findings by reference to testimony at trial and to factual concessions of those challenging the
law. Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. at 99-105; Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S.
at 314-15 nn.7-8. These justifications for the laws had indeed been articulated before the Court by
the government attorneys. See Vance v. Bradley, Brief for Appellants, at 6-19; Massachusetts Bd.
of Retirement v. Murgia, Brief for Appellants, at 42-46.
82. See TRiBE, supra note 2, at 1082-89, and cases cited therein.
83. See text accompanying note 115 infra.
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applicable doctrine. 84 The general problem of Eglit's distinction between the two types of age-based laws-his immutability principlehas been discussed above.8 5
The immutability thesis, as implemented by the guidelines, has an
additional problem: disabilities imposed on the elderly would easily
escape middle-tier scrutiny merely by setting a cap on the rule. Consider, for example, a hypothetical amendment to the Social Security
Act that required all workers to retire temporarily between ages 65 and
72. Because the disability thus imposed is not permanent and is not
based on an immutable characteristic, under Eglit's analysis the government would merely have to articulate a purpose such as administrative convenience and would not even have to justify its choice of the
particular age lines. As illustrated in this example, the immutability
thesis distracts from rather than clarifies consideration of whether a law
discriminates.
SUPREME COURT REJECTION OF THE AGE DISCRIMINATION CONCEPT

The previous section has attempted to demonstrate that Eglit's thesis, while ambitious and important, has several problems. This section
turns to a difficulty faced by any attempt to advance a constitutional
law of age discrimination: after Murgia 6 and Vance, do constitutional
age discrimination issues remain open to litigation?
Mandatory retirement laws-overtly age-based classifications that
impose a massive deprivation-are apparently the strongest case available for those seeking constitutional protection from age discrimination. In Cleveland Boardof Education v. LaF/eur,87 the dissent implied
that the majority's irrebuttable presumption analysis would be interpreted to mean that legislatively imposed mandatory retirement was
unconstitutional.88 Within only two years, however, in Murgia,89 the
84. See, e.g., Gunther, supra note 11; Struve, The Less-Restrictive-AlternativePrincile and
Economic Due Process, 80 HARv. L. REV. 1463 (1967).

85. See notes 28-72 supra and accompanying text.
86. Eglit suggests that the per curiam signature on the Court's opinion in Murgia means that
the Court regarded the decision to be unimportant. Eglit, supra note 3, at 884 n.133. Given the
length of the opinion, the detail of the factual and legal analysis, and its sweeping language coming after the Court had refused plenary hearing in a number of previous mandatory retirement
cases, that conclusion seems unlikely. One surmises instead that original drafts by one or more
Justices were thereafter revised extensively by others, and that because of the multiple participation in the writing, it was deemed inappropriate to name any single author. See McDonald v.
United States, 312 F.2d 847 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (per curiam); Wright, A Colleague's Tribute to Judge
Davidl Bazelon, on the Twenty-F#fh Anniversary ofhis Appointment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 250, 252
(1974).
87. 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
88. Id at 659 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
89. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
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Court upheld a government mandatory retirement law; the irrebuttable
presumption analysis of cases like LaFleur was abandoned without citation and the door of suspect classification analysis slammed in the
face of the elderly. Three years later, in Vance,90 the Court reaffirmed

and extended Murgia. Indeed, Murgia and Vance have now become
standard citations for the lowest tier-the minimal rationality test--of
equal protection analysis. The Court's actions seemed to close off the
possible development of a constitutional age discrimination doctrine.
Eglit himself concludes that "the breadth of the[sej decisions makes
successful equal protection or due process challenges to age distinctions
in any context extremely dubious." 9'
This section suggests that, while a broad interpretation of the opinions in Murgia and Vance is suggested by their tone, a close reading of
those two cases demonstrates that their holdings are quite narrow.
Most of the pertinent language is dicta, which can be easily distinguished in a future case if the Justices then sitting are convinced to do
so. Of course, even when a constitutional question has been determined by holding, it may be reopened, 92 but given the current state of
the law, the constitutionality of age discrimination may properly be regarded as not yet settled by holding. 93 Moreover, the cases are even
90. Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 (1979).
91. Eglit, supra note 3, at 880.
92. See Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 405-12 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
93. That a court is not bound by its own prior dicta is a general rule, see K. LLEWELLYN, THE
COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS

86 & n. 103 (1960), applicable also to the United

States Supreme Court. See Lehman v. Nakshian, 101 S. Ct. 2698, 2704 n.13 (1981).
In addition to the Murgia and Vance cases, there is a series of Supreme Court actions without
opinion which has left standing lower court rulings upholding mandatory retirement rules against
age discrimination claims. See, e.g., Schmeir v. Trustees of California State Universities and Colleges, 74 Cal. App. 3d 314, 141 Cal. Rptr. 472 (1977), appeal dismirsed, 440 U.S. 941 (1979);
Fazekas v. University of Houston, 565 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978), appeal dismissed, 440
U.S. 952 (1979); Slate v. Noll, 474 F. Supp. 882 (W.D. Wis. 1979), affd memr, 443 U.S. 1007
(1980). These actions are obviously not dicta, but their effect is problematic. Eglit states simply
that "summary dispositions by the Supreme Court have precedential weight," Eght, supra note 3,
at 880 n. 113, but the question is more complex. See generally Linzer, The Meaning of Certiorari
Denials, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 1227, 1291-99 & n.457 (1979), and works cited therein. Appeals from
state courts which are not regarded by the Supreme Court as substantial are "dismissed for want
of a substantial federal question" while similar nonsubstantial appeals from federal courts are
"affirmed" without opinion; the two are equivalent. R. STERN & E. GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT
PRACTICE 378 (5th ed. 1978). These summary actions are said to bind the lower courts. Hicks v.
Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 344 (1975). But a summary affirmance has also been said to be an affirmance of the lower court's judgment only, and not its reasoning. Illinois State Bd. of Elections v.
Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173 (1979); Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 176 (1977). Moreover, "the Court has not hesitated to discard a rule which a line of summary afflirmances may
appear to have established." Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379, 392 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring). Over the years, some have indeed suggested that summary affirmances and dismissals for
insubstantiality are entitled to little more precedential weight than denials of certiorari, or perhaps
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susceptible of a reading supporting intermediate tier scrutiny of age
discrimination claims.
A Broad Reading
In one permissible interpretation of the cases, Murgia and Vance
can be read broadly enough to foreclose the age discrimination issue
even in its most blatant manifestation, mandatory retirement.
The Mfurgia Court said that the aged do not meet any of the criteria for a suspect class,94 and, in particular, that old age does not define a "'discrete and insular' group" but instead a "stage" in our
lives. 95 In Afurgia, a program of individualized determination of
fitness-annual physical examinations after age 40-was in operation;
it was also conceded that the plaintiff had excellent health rendering
him capable of performing his duties. The Court nevertheless concluded in a broad holding that, even on such strong facts, the state was
permitted to use an adverse age-based generalization to make retirement decisions.
Vance can be given a similar broad reading. It extended Murgia
from the situation of uniformed police officers-a job making unusual
physical demands--to cover almost any type of work, : e., lawyers, accountants, lecturers, clerical and custodial workers, etc. In Vance, there
was a functioning program of individualized determination of fitness:
Foreign Service employees received biennial medical examinations and
special examinations when necessary and were subject to annual review
of performance. The Court nevertheless found that the government
was permitted to use an age-based rule for retirement.
The Court found the correlation of increasing age with decreasing
capacity to perform adequately to be a logical assumption. 96 It declared that "we have noted the common sense proposition that agingalmost by definition-inevitably wears us all down."' 97 It also suggested that the mere purpose of "providing promotion opportunities
• . .through early retirement" was acceptable, 98 apparently without reare even to be regarded as their functional equivalents. See A.

BiCKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANCH 126 (1962); Frankfurter & Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court at October Term,
1929, 44 HARv. L. REV. 1, 14 (1930). Thus, the Supreme Court summary cases on mandatory

retirement do not completely foreclose the age discrimination issue.
94. 427 U.S. at 313.
95. Id
96. 440 U.S. at 110 & n.28.
97. Id at 112.
98. Id at 101.
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gard to the abilities of those retired. These statements have a wide

reach.
Thus, on broad readings of these cases, enhanced scrutiny of
mandatory retirement rules in particular and old age as a legislative
classification appears to be foreclosed. Old age does not define a group
but rather a stage in life, the Court said,99 rejecting the notion that the
group needed any judicial protection. The Court's negative treatment
of these issues suggests a general antipathy toward any age discrimination claims by any age group.
A Narrow Reading
Narrower readings of Murgia and Vance are also possible. Such
readings leave open major constitutional age discrimination issues,
even as to the elderly.
Murgia is explicit that its holding concerns only the "class of uniformed state police officers over fifty."'00 That classification "draws the
line at a certain age in middle life," 10
' and thus all statements in the
opinion about the elderly are merely dicta. The private interest involved in Murgia was a limited one, as the disqualification was only
from a specific employment; it is well known that retired police officers
often have opportunities for private security work available to them.
The government interest, on the other hand, was an especially important one: "to protect the public by assuring the ability of state police to
respond to demands of their jobs."' 10 2 The job in question was found to
be "arduous,"' 103 where "physical ability" was of special importance,
and there was said to be a relationship between aging and the ability to
perform under stress.' ° 4 Moreover, it was not possible to evaluate the
risk of health failure without "a number of detailed studies," and unusual administrative inconvenience.10 5
This reasoning by the Court supports the state's decision in the
concrete case involving Officer Murgia. Significantly, the steps in this
reasoning were not invented by the Court, but were documented in the
contemporaneous legislative history, supported by studies, 0 6 and fur99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

427 U.S. at 313.
Id at 317.
Id at 313.
Id at 314 n.7.
Id at 310.
Id at 311.
Id
Id at 314-15 n.7.
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ther supported by testimony in the record, all cited by the Court. 01 7 In
addition, "even [appellee's] experts concede[d] that there is a general
relationship between advancing age and decreasing physical ability to
respond to the demands of the job."'08
Thus the ratio decidendi or narrow holding of Murgia is limited to
a situation where: the line drawn does not set off the class of the elderly; the conflict is between a limited private interest and an especially
important public one; physical ability is involved and is especially required; it is conceded that age correlates with required ability and there
is no administratively feasible way to individually determine requisite
health; and there are contemporaneous statements of legislative purposes, based on data known to the legislature and confirmed in the trial
record.
Vance is also susceptible to a narrow reading. The government
interest, again, is an especially important one--promoting the conduct
of foreign affairs and safeguarding national security' t 9-and the jobs in
question were said to have special health requirements because they
were under "difficult and often hazardous conditions."' "10 The legislative purposes considered by the Court were contemporaneously expressed by Congress."' The correlation between age and capacities
relevant to the job were conceded." 2 Moreover, since the Court explicitly and repeatedly deemed the whole issue of age discrimination to be
abandoned by the plaintiffs," 3 any statements about the constitutional
issues are manifestly dicta.
Vance does extend Murgia:1 4 it is not limited to jobs requiring
physical abilities, it permits a greater impairment of the interest in employment, and it fails to invoke enhanced scrutiny even when older
persons are involved rather than the middle-aged. Yet the ratio
decidendi of Vance remains limited.
One may conclude therefore that, while Murgia and Vance reveal
judicial unreceptivity to the constitutional claims they discuss, as a
matter of precedent the issues of age discrimination remain open for
another day even for the elderly, and afortiori for other age groups. If
107. Id at 311.
108. Id at 310-11.
109. 440 U.S. at 101 n.19.
110. Id at 103.
111. Id at 98-100.
112. Id at 111-12.
113. Id at 96 n.10 & 110 n.27.
114. Eglit asserts, to the contrary, that the result in Vance "inevitably followed" from Murgia.
Eglit, supra note 3, at 883.
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only because Murgia involved the middle-aged and the constitutional
issue was not before the Court in Vance, one would conclude that the
constitutionality of age discrimination, even against the elderly, is still
open for argument after those cases.
Middle-Tier Reading
One could argue that both Murgia and Vance provide support for
the proposition that intermediate tier analysis is applicable to age discrimination. While the opinions disclaim the applicability of strict
scrutiny and announce a minimum rationality standard, they also make
a point of showing that the governmental actions had certain attributes
which, in other contexts, have withstood intermediate tier scrutiny.
The opinions in both cases demonstrate that the governmental interest involved is important, show a substantial relationship or close fit
between means and end, refer to current articulations of the justification for the rule, and limit use of rationalizations supplied as afterthoughts in favor of contemporaneous legislative expressions.
Moreover, the opinions referred to empirical support for the legislature's factual assumptions, appeared to balance the governmental and
individual interest, and (at least in Vance 115) noted that the presumption was not irrebuttable and that individualized determination was
possible through which exceptions could be made to the rule. The
opinions did not specifically state that those attributes noted as present
were required, but the Court's discussion of them in detail demonstrates that they were thought relevant to the equal protection issue. A
future Court ready to hold that those attributes of intermediate scrutiny
were required in age discrimination cases would find Murgia and
Vance congenial precedents.
THE NEED FOR A THEORY OF THE COURT'S ROLE

A proposal on how age distinctions should be treated under the
equal protection clause requires more than that the issue should be
deemed still open; it also requires a general principle of how that clause
should be applied. At base, the principle must reflect some theory of
the role of the Supreme Court in our system of government. Such a
theory, overlapping law and political science, is required because a proposal that certain types of legislation, like age classifications, should be
struck down under equal protection reasoning is simultaneously a pro115. 440 U.S. at 111-12 n.29.
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posal on allocation of decisionmaking power." 16 A proposal to recognize a constitutional law of age discrimination reserves ultimate
authority over age classification statutes to the Supreme Court, rather
than the democratically elected branches of the federal government or
the states.
Alternative Theories

A variety of competing theories have been prominent in recent debate over when the judiciary should play an activist constitutional role.
This more general debate has relevance to the functions of the Court in
equal protection cases, first, in deciding what type of legislation is
deemed suspect or semi-suspect, and second, in scrutinizing laws under
the appropriate standards. The traditional theory is that both the rationale and the content of judicial activism are founded upon the text
of the Constitution.' t 7 In a second approach, used by the Warren
Court in equal protection analysis," 8 the Court may look outside the
constitutional text to various sources of basic values. Four noted authors have recently resurveyed the topic. John Ely has criticized both
theories just stated,' '9 and suggested that the Court's essential role in
judicial review is a "representation-reinforcing" one of protecting the
democratic process. 120 Jesse Choper, on the other hand, has suggested
that the protection of individual liberty is the fundamental constitutional mandate the courts are to enforce. 121 Laurence Tribe has identi116. See Fried, Two Concepts of Interests: Some Reflections on the Supreme Court's Balancing
Test, 76 HARV.L. REV. 755 (1963).
117. The theory of a text-based or "interpretivist" definition of the Court's proper role in
equal protection cases traces to Chief Justice Marshall's opinion on its article III powers in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), and to THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 228-30 (A.
Hamilton) (Fairfield 2d ed. 1981). In the extreme version of the theory, it is claimed that in
constitutional cases the Court "has only one duty-to lay the article of the Constitution which is
invoked beside the statute which is challenged and to decide whether the latter squares with the
former." United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 62 (1936). For an example of the general scholarly
ridicule of such a literalist version of the theory, see A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH
89-91 (1962). But "[t]he pure interpretive model should not be confused with literalism in constitutional interpretation, particularly with 'narrow' or 'crabbed' literalism." Grey, Do We Have an
Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703, 706 n.9 (1975) (emphasis in original). See also
Grey, Originsofthe Unwritten Constitution: FundamentalLaw in American Revolutionary Thought,
30 STAN. L. REV. 843, 844-46 nn.8-10 (1978).
118. Eg., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
119. See Ely, The Wages of Crying Wo/f A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920
(1973); Ely, Foreword- On DircoveringFundamentalValues, 92 HARV. L. REV. 5 (1978).
120. See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).
121. See J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS (1980). See

also Levine, "The GreatExecutive Hand of CriminalJustice- The Crime Problem andthe Activist
Judge, 7 HASTINOS CON. L.Q. 907, 947-62 (1980); Wright, The Role ofthe Supreme Court in a
Democratic Society--IudicialActivim or Restraint?, 54 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1968).
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fled seven "models" that organize consideration of the Court's role. 22
And Charles Black links the first two approaches by suggesting we treat
the ninth amendment as part of the Constitution, directing us to recognize rights outside its explicit text.' 23
The Court's application of enhanced scrutiny to gender-based
classifications provides a testing case for such theories. There is still no
consensus understanding of the justification for the role the Court plays
in such cases. What it may be doing is scrutinizing laws which are
based upon, and which reinforce, traditional negative stereotypes held
by the powerful about the less powerful. The combination of the limited influence exercisable by the less powerful in the political process,
the slur represented by the stereotypes, the inaccuracy of the stereotypes, and the effect of such law in reinforcing the stereotypes, may
define a particular evil that must be corrected, if at all, by a Court relatively free of dominant political and social currents.
Eglit adopts none of these theories explicitly. The theory of the
role of the Court implicit in his discussion, however, may be that of the
Warren Court, as Eglit appears to believe that the Court has an appropriate function striking down a statutory classification that "flies in the
face of fundamental societal values[,]"' 24 "basic social concepts' 1 25 or
126
"basic notions of equality and justice."'
One's analysis of age discrimination claims is influenced by which
underlying theory of the Court's role one adopts; claims that the
Supreme Court should brand some age discrimination unconstitutional
fare better under some theories than others.' 27 The Court in Murgia
seemed to rely in part on a theory akin to Ely's: as in the famous footnote of United States v. Carolene Products Co. ,128 only groups which
because of prejudice are substantially unrepresented in the electoral
process have a claim for Court intervention to protect their interests.
This approach is indicated by the Murgia Court's comments that old
122. See generaly TRIBE, supra note 2.
123. See generaly BLACK, supra note 12. Earlier, Black had suggested that some constitutional questions can be decided by reasoning based on the structure of our governmental system.
C. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969).

124. Eglit, supra note 3, at 862.
125. Id at 861.

126. Id at 901.
127. To apply individual liberty or fundamental values analyses, difficult questions must be
solved. Without pursuing the discussion here, Myres McDougal and his associates, for example,
believe that a basic nondiscrimination norm subsumes a prohibition of age discrimination. See
McDougal, Lasswell & Chen, The Human Rights ofthe Aged" An Application ofthe General Norm
of Nondrcrimination, 28 U. FLA. L. REv. 639 (1976).
128. 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
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age does not define a "discrete and insular group" in need of "extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process."1 29 Applying that approach could lead to conclusions the reverse of Eglit's:
one might agree with the Court that the elderly are well represented in
politics but, because minors are excluded from voting and holding office, extend enhanced scrutiny to laws burdening children. Tribe has
30
concluded that children are a "semi-discrete minority."'
Stereotypes andPreudice

Analogy to the gender cases is one starting point in considering if
there are other groups which, under current case law, should receive
the protection of intermediate scrutiny. Detailing that analogy is
outside the scope of this article, but it may well lead to identifying a
role for the Court in scrutinizing laws which both derive from and reinforce traditional negative stereotypes held by the more powerful about
the less powerful. This hypothesis may be used to consider whether or
not it is justifiable to extend an intermediate level of scrutiny to laws
disadvantaging one or another age group.
Analysis will be facilitated if certain distinctions are introduced.
First, there are age effects in society, Ze., age-based classifications or
practices, such as the "age/work effect" (mandatory retirement and
age-based hiring rules). While any age differentiation is "discrimination" in a loose sense, the term age discrimination seems most usefully
limited to age effects that violate legal or constitutional norms. Second,
there are widely held factual generalizations about the characteristics of
age groups ("stereotypes" in a wider sense). The term stereotype
(stereotype proper) is most usefully confined to negative and inaccurate
generalizations. Third, there are adverse emotions or sentiments
widely held toward members of an age group, which may be termed
prejudice. These may range from a fear like gerontophobia, to the
more common ambivalence, conscious or unconscious, felt toward the
elderly or toward adolescents. Thus differentiated, a stereotype is a
supposed factual statement; prejudice is an emotion; an age effect is a
social practice.
Either stereotypes or prejudices may help produce the other. An
age effect may be the product of either or both, or may be the product
of neither (as when the old are pushed from jobs by the competition of
129. 427 U.S. at 313.

130. He further thinks that the elderly should be so classified. TIUBE, supra note 2, at 1080 &
1081 n.14.
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the middle-aged). A legal or constitutional doctrine of age discrimination may focus on the age effect, the stereotype or the prejudice, or on
some combination.
The several age groups are widely perceived in our culture through
the lens of various factual generalizations which are reinforced by government action. These generalizations are often stereotypes, that is,
they are negative and substantially inaccurate. Such stereotypes particularly exist as to transitional age groups like adolescents and the

"young-old" (under age 75).131 Age groups, on the other hand, are

only rarely subject to widespread negative prejudice (generalized antipathy). The relative absence of overt emotional prejudice raises the
question whether or not it is appropriate to extend the concept of discrimination to include age discrimination, and to expect the Court to
function as to age classification like it functions as to race classifications.
The analogy to age is a closer one for gender than for race. Stereotypes as to women and their social role exist, though it is arguable
whether prejudice exists. The stereotyping has been deemed sufficient
to develop thereon a constitutional law of gender-based classifications.
Cases involving gender classification have struck down laws on analyses emphasizing their use of "archaic and overbroad" generalizations, 32 and "social sterotypes" which were not a "legitimate, accurate
proxy" 3 3 for a pertinent characteristic. That development may be in134
structive in formulating a theory of age discrimination.
Furthermore, there may be close connections between factual stereotype and emotional prejudice. Decisionmakers who impose hardships on those toward whom they supposedly feel no antipathy, based
on erroneous factual presuppositions, may well be harboring ambivalence-perhaps unconsciously So.135 On this line of analysis, age effects
131. See Neugarten, Age Groups in American Society and the Rise of the Young-Old, 415 ANNALS 187 (1974).

132. Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977).
133. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).

134. A variant test rejects a gender distinction not when it is "overbroad" and an "[in]accurate
proxy," but when it is "archaic," that is the "accidental by-product of a traditional way of thinking
about women." Rostker v. Goldberg, 101 S.Ct. 2646, 2656 (1981) (quoting Califano v. Webster,
430 U.S. 313, 320 (1977), and Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 233 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring)). See also Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 101 S.Ct. 1200 (1981). Under
this test, the legislature's deliberate and recent decision to foster a stereotype would be accorded
deference by the Court. See Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 101 S.Ct. 2633 (1981).
135. The relative significance of stereotypes and prejudice has been discussed, usually in the
context of racial discrimination, as part of the debate on the significance of motivation in constitutional law. See Ely, Legislative andAdministrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J.
1205 (1970); Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of UnconstitutionalLegisla-

AGE DISCRIMINATION

that are products of stereotypes may also reflect prejudice, and agebased classifications may deserve enhanced scrutiny of the kind already
extended by the Court to other classes which are victims of discrimination based on prejudice.
If, however, an age effect reflects merely a stereotype and not a
prejudice, it is questionable what warrant the Court has to correct the
legislature's error by substituting its own judgment. A recent case on
gender discrimination suggests that the Court will then only require a
recent and manifest decision by the legislature that the generalization it
36
employs is actually intended.
In applying an analysis emphasizing stereotypes and prejudice, the
tive Motivation, 1971 SuP. CT. REV. 95 [hereinafter cited as Brest]; Symposium, 15 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 925 (1978); and the works cited in Simon, supra note 51, at 1043-44 nn.l & 3.
Age discrimination claims generally involve rules where the age classification is manifest on
their face. No resort to motivation analysis is then required to bring these rules within the category of such claims, but attention to motivation may be relevant to deciding the legitimacy of the
claims.
Larry Simon would proscribe governmental action based on racial prejudice, defined by him
as negative emotions or attitudes directed categorically against members of a group simply because of their membership. Id at 1047. Negative stereotypes, to Simon, are significant primarily
as reflections of such prejudice. Id. at 1096.
Some have concluded, to the contrary, that racial prejudice derives from the stereotypeerroneous theories about the factual shortcomings of groups--and that discrimination is thus less
a matter of hearts than of minds. R. NiSBETr & L. Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND
SHORTCOMINGS IN SOCIAL JUDGMENT 237-42 (1980) [hereinafter NISBETr & Ross]. Similarly, it
has been argued that "much action taken by governmental bodies and officials not caused by
attitudes of racial hostility nevertheless ir based on racial stereotypes [that may be] true or false,
...positive, negative, or neutral." Alexander, Introduction:" Motivation and Constitutionality, 15
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 925, 943 (1978) (emphasis in original). Some would emphasize governmental
use of negative racial (or gender) stereotypes in identifying unconstitutional governmental action.
See Brest, supra.
Erroneous group stereotypes may persist/for many reasons. Because of cultural lag, stereotypes about the elderly are held by the public long after research has demonstrated their inaccuracy to specialists. See Levine, The Generalist Versus the Specialist." The New Oxford Dictionary
Reveals a Gap, CHANGE 8, 9 (May-June 1981). Even specialists may hold on to old stereotypes
after the underlying facts have changed. See Levine, Book Review. Women in the CriminalJustice
System, 455 ANNALS 203, 204 (1981). Some conclude that stereotypes are culturally transmitted
theories that persist due to common human cognitive errors in assessing information and drawing
inferences. See NISBEr & Ross, supra. In a psychoanalytic model, to the contrary, stereotypes
may be thought to persist due to unconsciously held negative attitudes. Among other indicators
which would lead one to suspect the prevalence of such negative attitudes are the convergence of
consciously held, erroneous, negative factual ascriptions; purportedly neutral or benign action
based thereon; and serious, but unacknowledged, adverse impact of that action. See Levine, Four
ModelsforAge/Work Policy Research, 20 GERONTOLOGIST 561 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Four
Models] (psychoanalytic model of ambivalence); cf. Simon, supra note 51, at 1061-62 (stereotypes
as self-deception). Older workers and late adolescents-like women-are among the groups affected by social and governmental practices characterized by the convergence of these three factors.
136. Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 101 S. Ct. 2633 (1981). See also note 134 supra; Bice, RationalityAnalysis in ConstitutionalLaw, 65 MINN. L. REv. 1, 33-37 (1980) (considering legislative
beliefs about empirical reality, and the relevance of changed conditions after the legislature's action).
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Court would first have to determine their prevalence by considering the
history of both private and public practices and attitudes as to a particular age group, in order to select the suitable standard of scrutiny. If
sufficient stereotyping and prejudice existed generally to merit enhanced scrutiny, the Court would then determine the challenged statute's constitutionality by examining the extent to which it reflected and
reinforced those attitudes and beliefs. This approach provides a
method to analyze the three problems stated at the beginning of this
article. 137 The stereotypes and prejudice as to the elderly and children
can be compared with those prevalent as to other social groups; those
as to the elderly and children can be compared with each other; and
those incorporated in age-based deprivations can be compared to those
incorporated in age-based benefits.
In Murgia the Court said that the aged have not "been subjected to
unique disabilities on the basis of stereotyped characteristics not truly
indicative of their abilities."' 3 8 It is unclear which element of that
proposition the Court intended to deny. The exclusion of the aged
from the workforce has been a unique disability. Mandatory retirement is apparently based at least in part on stereotypes as to their characteristics. So perhaps the Court believed that the negative
"stereotypes" of the aged were actually accurate generalizations "truly
indicative" of their abilities. A factual issue is thus framed; previous
Courts, after all, regarded the treatment of women and of blacks to be
based in the order of nature also. 139 Application of a stereotype analysis may lead to the conclusion that the situation of the elderly and adolescents is analogous to that of women.
Textual Basis
The traditional approach requires the Court to base its activism on
the text of the Constitution. Apparently self-evident to laymen and officially endorsed by Chief Justice John Marshall, 14 0 this theory was ridiculed by the legal realists and recently savaged by Ely.' 4 1 There is an
intriguing basis in such an approach, however, for claims by the aged
to enhanced scrutiny like that afforded women or blacks. Certain discrimination on the basis of age, gender and race is prohibited by delib137.

See text following note 3 supra.

138. 427 U.S. at 313.
139. See, e.g., Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1873) (Bradley, J., concurring);
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).

140. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
141. See Ely, The Wages of Crying Woal. A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920

(1973) (criticizing "interpretivism").

AGE DISCRIMINATION

erately adopted, explicit bans in the Constitution: the fifteenth, 42
nineteenth143 and twenty-sixth'" ' amendments prohibit the denial or
abridgement of the right to vote on account of race, sex and age (for
those above 18).1 45 These amendments can be read to mark out those
distinctions for special constitutional treatment, manifesting "constitutional choices" '4 in favor of equal citizenship without exclusion on the
basis of race, gender or age (for those above age 18). They can be interpreted as guaranteeing equal political participation without regard to
distinctions based on race, sex or age, and more generally as prohibiting the use of such distinctions to treat some as "second class citizens." 47 One favorable to the values manifested in those amendments
could take the further step from reading the amendments as guarantees
of equal political participation to interpreting them as guarantees of
148
equal opportunity to participate in the economy and the society.
Such an interpretation would justify a more literal reading of the guarantee of "the equal protection of the laws" to test laws based on and
reinforcing stereotypes contravening those constitutional values. This
approach provides a text-based justification for enhanced scrutiny of
race and gender classifications that justifies similar scrutiny of age clas142. The fifteenth amendment provides:
The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the

United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.
U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
143. The nineteenth amendment provides:
The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the
United States or by any State on account of sex.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIX, § 1.
144. The twenty-sixth amendment provides:
The right of citizens of the United States, who are eighteen years of age or older, to vote
shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of age.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. XXVI, § 1. If one regards the poll tax as essentially a wealth-based exclusion
from voting, the twenty-fourth amendment can serve as the basis for a similar argument that a
"constitutional choice" has been made in favor of equal citizenship without exclusion on the basis
of poverty. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV, § 1.
145. Other references to age in the constitutional text are collected and discussed in Age Discrimination, supra note 1, at 49.
146. See Levine, "The Great Executive Hand of Criminal Justice' 7he Crime Problem and the
Activist Judge, 7 HAsTINGS CON. L.Q. 907, 947-62 (1980).
147. The nineteenth amendment "seems very strongly to imply that in our political society
discriminations against women are not only irrational but also unfair." BLAcK, supra note 12, at
73.
148. Cf Karst, Foreword" Equal Citizenshp Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 5-11 (1976) (goal that blacks and other minorities be equal participants in society). Differing from the theory set out in the text, Karst's citizenship argument is based on the fourteenth
amendment. A citizenship argument can also be based on the structure of our government. See
C. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CoNSTIUTrONAL LAW (1969).
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sifications of adults, without extending an open invitation to similarly
apply enhanced scrutiny to a host of other legislative classifications.
The argument might at least provide a foot in the door by explaining to the Court one way to draw a line including age along with race
and gender. As John Ely has stated,
[B!efore the Court can get to the "balancing" stage, before it can
worry about the next case and the case after that (or even about its
institutional position) it is under an obligation to trace its premises to
the charter from which it derives its authority. A neutral and durable
principle may be a thing of beauty and a joy forever. But if it lacks
connection with any value the Constitution marks as special, it is not
principle and the Court has no business imposing
a constitutional
49
it. 1

This text-based argument of course is no substitute for analysis of the
nature of age effects, to convince a court of the desirability for consequentialist, deontological, and institutional reasons of ruling that certain age-based classifications are unconstitutional.
TOWARD A SOCIAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY

OF AGE DISCRIMINATION

A legal theory of the constitutional law of age discrimination
should have-in addition to a judicial theory-some social theory detailing what are the age effect phenomena to which it is proposed to
apply the label "ageism" 150 or the legal conclusion "age discrimina149. Ely, The Wages of Crying Wo.' A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 949
(1973) (emphasis in original).
150. Eglit defines the term "ageism" to mean "the use of age-based distinctions and perceptions to impose negative consequences upon the target of such distinctions and perceptions." Eglit, upra note 3, at 861 n.4. The word was put into currency by Robert Butler. See Butler, The
Effects of Medical and Health Progress on the Social and Economic Aspects of the LIre Cycle, 2
INDUS. GERONTOLOGY 1 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Life Cycle]; Butler, Ageiwr Another Form of
Bigotry, 9 GERONTOLOGIST 243 (1969); R. BUTLER, WHY SURVIVE? BEING OLD IN AMERICA 11

(1975).
Eglit states that whereas Butler confined the term to anti-elderly references, he himself proposes to introduce a "broader perspective, deeming the term applicable in all contexts," including
anti-youth references. Eglit, supra note 3, at 861 n.4. In fact, however, when Butler introduced
the term, he defined it from the broad perspective to refer to "a deep-seated uneasiness on the part
of one age group toward another" with anti-elderly references only one instance of a phenomenon
applicable to all age groups. Life Cycle, supra, at 5. Accord, Butler, Ageism A Foreword, 36 J.
Soc. ISSUES 8 (1980). Butler's usage includes systematic age-based stereotyping as well as
prejudice, R. BUTLER, WHY SURVIVE? BEING OLD IN AMERICA 11 (1975), but he accepts the

differentiation of ageism from unreasonable fear or irrational hatred of an age group, such as
gerontophobia. Id

See also Palmore, Gerontophobia Versus Ageism, 12 GERONTOLOGIST 213

(1972).
Eglit uses ageism to refer to age-based distinctions as well as perceptions and perhaps consequences. The broad reference may be an infelicitous usage, but it appears entrenched. For example, J. LEVIN & W. LEVIN, AGEISM: PREJUDICE AND DISCRIMINATION AGAINST THE ELDERLY
72-73 (1980), defines ageism to include what is here differentiated as prejudice (interpersonal hos-
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tion." At several different places in his paper,' 5 1 Eglit suggests his understanding of age discrimination by giving explanations for or
justifications of age effects (age-based differentiation in general), or of
its particular manifestation in an age/work effect (mandatory retirement). It is desirable to attempt ina more systematic way to construct
a theory of age effects claimed to constitute discrimination. 1 52 A
clearer understanding of age effect phenomena can serve as a partial
basis for the judgment whether or not they should be deemed constitutionally suspect.
Four different sets of explanations for the phenomenon can be
stated. 53 Based on each explanation, one can construct or refute
claimed justifications, which purport to distinguish age-based classifications from constitutionally suspect race or gender discrimination.4
These positions can be stated in a pure form as models or ideal types. '5
Any actual societal example of age classification can be examined to
determine the extent it approximates one or more of the models.
These models can be used in connection with three sorts of questions. First, how can the age-based practice be explained, whether on
the level of macroeconomic forces, social structure and cultural norms,
or on the level of individual purposes of relevant decisionmakers? (For
example, if 18 to 20-year-olds are kept from jury service in a given
district, is it because of a practice of replenishing the jury wheel from
fresh voting lists every two years?) Second, are the factual assumptions
made by the decisionmakers even arguably accurate? (For example, is
it true that most 17-year-olds are too immature to vote, and that individualized screening is impractical?) Third, assuming the first two
questions are answered, does the explanation of the practice supply a
normative justification? (For example, if older workers are forced to
retire because youths want their jobs and dominate the unions, does
that explanation describe acceptable competition or condemnable discrimination?) The examples considered in the following discussion will
emphasize mandatory retirement, the most litigated area of age discrimination claims.
The first model rests on the premise that age differentiation is rational. One sub-type concerns substantive rationality: that the aged
tility based on group membership), stereotype (belief regarding group members) and discrimination (injury based on group membership).
151. Eglit, supra note 3, at 860, 899-900, 902.
152. See Age DiscraiWion, supra note I; Four Models, supra note 135.
153. See id

154. "Ideal type" is used, not normatively, but in Max Weber's sense. See M. WEBER,THE
THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION (1964).
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(or children or other age group) are in fact different from the rest of us.
For example, the aged are said to be inferior to the young in job relevant capacities or less cost-efficient workers, 155 or children are considered particularly vulnerable.' 56 This substantively rational basis for
age-based rules is thought to distinguish them from gender- or racebased classifications. Another sub-type concerns process rationality:
there is said to be utility in using rules which presume the characteristics of an age-defined class in place of using individualized assessment.
Third, even if one age group were not inferior in capacities to another,
rotation of opportunities is sometimes thought to possess rational value
for a system (systemic rationality). The old, for example, are thought
to lack various novel viewpoints which the young have, so that rotation
of jobs is justified. If the factual bases of rationality arguments are
erroneous, they reflect stereotypes.
A second model rests on the commonplace observation that each
person begins young and in time becomes older. It may be argued that
age-based rules reflect the intertemporalchoice of decisionmakers as to
how they wish to lead their own lives: today's middle-aged decisionmakers deal with the current elderly as proxies for themselves. The
(doubtful) conclusion is drawn that they therefore would not mistreat
them; thus, whatever rules have been adopted for the elderly are presumed appropriate.
Another argument based on the same observation is that even if
the rules for some age groups are unfair to them in some way, all persons will undergo them in turn; thus, there is no inequality. A variant
concerns opportunities or benefits as to which the supply is limited, and
argues that rotation is appropriate. Thus, even if only the middle-aged
can have jobs, or only the aged can receive certain benefits, it is argued
that there is no inequality as each person will receive his chance in
turn. Others would argue that rotation of inequality does not satisfy
the equal protection norm.
A third model accepts that there is intergroup competition between
different age cohorts for scarce jobs and other benefits; it sees no constitutional infirmity in whatever arrangements reflect the result of the
155. Employers have often been motivated by desire for increased efficiency. See generally W.
GRAEBNER, A HISTORY OF RETIREMENT (1980).

156. The courts have treated children differently, not because youth is a mutable quality, but
rather because of a perception that children are indeed different. A recent decision noted three

reasons for this perception: children are particularly vulnerable, they lack experience and maturity of judgment, and in our society the responsibility for the upbringing of children and the management of their affairs is properly vested in the parents. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634-39
(1979).
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struggle. If the legislature and other overt rule-making processes are
considered, rather than the invisible hand of competition, those
processes are still regarded as appropriate reconcilers of competing interests. Democratic and societal decisionmaking are assumed adequately to reflect the interests of any group which is not so hated as to
be outside the mainstream of society. The conclusion follows that agebased classifications adopted by the legislature should not be subjected
to judicial strict scrutiny. The argument rests on an assumption that
neither the elderly, children, nor any other age group is excluded from
appropriate decisionmaking influence due to prejudice, stereotype or
other reasons.
A fourth model conceives of age-based decisions in an intergenerational framework. On the one hand, it is argued that decisionmakers
are likely to have children and old people in their families and, it is
thought, would not want to harm their own. On the other hand,
prejudice may exist in the form of intergenerationalhostility. It is possible that decisionmakers express ambivalence to their own children and
parents in making age-based decisions, or express their own fear of
youthful characteristics or fear of aging and death. The conclusion
drawn may be that various age-based practices are not purely benevolent in purpose, but rather ambivalent (perhaps unconsciously so).
Age-based practices explained by ambivalence cannot automatically be
57
accepted as non-invidious.
A systematic consideration of age discrimination claims will be
clarified by use of these four models. They may be used in analysis at
each of the steps required under current equal protection theory: when
the Court considers the facts as to the treatment of that class in our
society as a general matter (for example, how is the history of
mandatory retirement to be understood?) in order to select the appropriate tier of analysis; and when it considers the facts as to the challenged governmental action (for example, the particular retirement
statute) in order to decide whether it survives the appropriate level of
scrutiny.
CONCLUSION

The symposium in which Eglit's paper and this article appear is
157. See note 135 supra. One of the ways (of at least half a dozen) in which psychology and

psychoanalysis can be of use to the law is to expose the implicit psychological functions of legal
and social institutions, such as age-based practices. The policy decision to either reaffirm or repudiate those functions can then be made on a more enlightened and conscious basis. See Levine,
Book Review- The Use of Psychiatry in the Law, 450 ANNALS 285 (1980).
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part of an ongoing debate about age effects as social and psychological
phenomena and age discrimination as a legal concept. Language employed by the Supreme Court in constitutional cases involving the elderly, the middle-aged and children reflects little appreciation of the
phenomena nor willingness to employ the concept. Nevertheless, the
holdings of these cases can be read so as to leave room for future evolution of doctrine. Moreover, Congress has adopted a series of lawsincluding the Age Discrimination Act 158 which is the centerpiece of this
symposium-that recognizes the applicability of the discrimination
concept to existing age-based practices; four Justices in Frontiero159 declared similar congressional recognition to be pertinent to the Court's
equal protection interpretation. Thus a constitutional law of age discrimination may yet be developed.
Proposals such as Eglit's are welcome and important contributions
to this development. His goal of a unified theory dealing with all age
groups will challenge others considering the issue. The specifics of his
immutability test and five guidelines, however, do not appear to adequately define an appropriate role for the Court and to frame consideration of the varieties of age-discriminatory practices.
A more useful line for exploration may begin with considering the
extent to which age-based practices reflect (perhaps unconsciously)
traditional negative and inaccurate age stereotypes and prejudices, and
the extent to which such practices reinforce them. An appropriate role
for the Court may be identified in scrutinizing the manifestations of
such ageism in the products of the political process. The development
of such a theory awaits exploration on another day.

158. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6101-6107 (1976 & Supp. Ill 1979). See also statutes discussed in Age Discrimnation, supra note 1.
159. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (plurality opinion).
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